"The question, whether the oÙs…a that is common to Father and Son is prèth oÙs…a or deutšra oÙs…a, is misleading and should be avoided. For this antithesis, as we now understand it on the basis of Aristotle's Categories, was neither familiar to Athanasius, nor even applicable to the theological debates of his time" 1 .
A little further on, the Cambridge professor specifies this unsuitability of such a move even better:
"The relationship which Athanasius posits between Father and Son cannot be expressed in terms of a logic which was only constructed to deal with ordinary individual objects, the classes into which they fall, and the essential and accidental resemblances between them" 2 .
Thus, the statement about Gregory of Nyssa in the article that Stead dedicated to the terminology of the Cappadocian a few years later, becomes particularly intriguing. In Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa 3 he seems to have not forgotten what he affirmed with regard to Athanasius, ("it was more important to consider what was believed than to insist on a precise terminology" 4 ) while he traces the Trinitarian thought of the Cappadocian Father, since he shows how even for the work of Gregory of Nyssa a detailed assessment of philosophical distinctions can become deeply inadequate. However, focusing on the problem of what he believes is lacking in the articulation between the divine simplicity of essence and the identification of the three persons, Stead seems to run the risk of losing the extraordinary wealth of the theological -and thus, metaphysical -contribution of Gregory. Let us proceed, then, to read what directly follows the 1976 article -its conclusions:
"I would add that in his doctrine of the three hypostases Gregory uses two arguments which have no connection with the logic of universals and particulars. The first is that the names Father, Son and Spirit must each have a real «hypostasis», they must not be empty names. The second is that each person must have his own distinct «hypostasis», i.e. his own distinct manner of origination; this is of course contrary to what is normally found in the members of a species. But does this interpretation of the three persons as individual members of a species give us an adequate theological picture of the Trinity? It has of course been frequently criticized as giving too little emphasis to the unity of the three persons; and I have tried to show that it rests upon a philological myth. But I will end by submitting a rather different point. I think that we cannot do justice even to human individuality if we think of several individuals as possessing a common character, with certain distinguishing marks simply added to it; human individuality is rather the particular blend and proportion of common characteristics. A fortiori, any adequate doctrine of the three divine persons must somehow do justice to the doctrine of divine simplicity; it must not represent each person as a compound entity, composed of a common «ousia» plus distinguishing characteristics; it must seek to integrate these two facts, and show that the distinct persons represent distinct ways in which the one common «ousia» is developed and manifested. Gregory fails at this point because his philosophical equipment is not handled with the seriousness which is needed in order to do justice to his theological and Christian intuitions" 5 .
We want to attempt to engage with this last statement by retrieving certain passages of Gregory from within the context of his theological debate with Eunomius; we will do this in order to see how the individuation of the divine Persons does not negate the cogency of the affirmation of the divine simplicity thanks to a common sense, somewhat pre-philosophical observation: the observation of the reciprocal dimension of the relation that is made known by the divine names that are revealed. We then see that it is precisely this relational character of reciprocity that allows for the interpretation of the difference of hypostases: not as being caused by characteristics that are added to the common essence, but rather as different ways in which the total self-giving of the same oÙs…a is in the reciprocal relation of the loving subjects.
Contra Eunomium I 496-507:
The prÕj ¥llela scšsij in the Ambit of Its Trinitarian Ontological Valence. It may help to first recall how Gregory of Nyssa, in the school of Basil, reiterates the importance of tracing the debate about the value of the ÐmooÚsioj back to the revealed names (Father, Son) and not, as did Eunomius, to semantic reductions. These reductions were quite common in the post-Nicene Trinitarian debate, the divine names were converted into the notions of Unbegotten (¢gšnnhtoj) and begotten (gšnnema). As is well-known, the argument already advanced by Basil with Eunomius was that the latter was changing the referent as modifying the notion was to neglect the very relationship present in the revelation of Christ, who calls God his "Father" 6 .
Gregory, like Basil, appoints to biblical text. The passage that is perhaps the most incisive and concise regarding the question that interests us here, is found in the first book of Contra Eunomium. There Gregory focuses on the explanation of the otherness of the intra-Trinitarian communion:
"By having heard from the truth «Father» and «Son» we learned that in the two subjects [or in the two significants? -™n dÚo to‹j Øpokeimšnoij?] there is a unity of nature (t¾n ˜nÒthta tÁj fÚsewj), being this naturally indicated by the names for the reciprocal relationship (tÁj prÕj ¥llhla scšsewj) and by the voice of the Lord. What could the one who in fact said «the Father and I are one», have meant (shma…nei) but to express (t… ¥llo À tÒ te […] par…sthsin) that he himself is not without a principle of his being (m¾ ¥narcon ˜autoà) through conformity with the nature 7 of the Father (di¦ tÁj toà patrÕj Ðmolog…aj) [first sense], and [to express] the communion of nature (tÕ koinÕn […] tÁj fÚsewj) through the union/unity with the Father (di¦ tÁj prÕj tÕn patšra ˜nÒthtoj) [second sense]?" 8
As is well-known, the argument of Gregory refocuses the believer's attention onto the revelation of the filiation of the Word, and onto the eternity of this relation: this is in perfect continuity with the letter of Basil to Maximus of Ephesus.
Let us briefly recall this letter. In it, Basil would trace the source of the Anomean bishops' unorthodox definition back to the doctrine of Dionysius of Alexandria -the Bishop of Alexandria in the middle years of the third century (c. 248-260) . This was the inspiration, after Nicaea, for a portion of the episcopate that had not accepted the formula according to which the Son is ÐmooÚsioj with respect to the Father. This error was not due to immoral judgment, wrote Basil, but it was due to an emphasis that was placed in opposition to Sabellius, and this was in order to sustain that the Father and the Son "are not the same subject" (oÙ tautÕn tù ØpokeimšnJ) 9 . Dionysius had distinguished the Father and the Son not only according to their hypostases (oÙc ˜terÒthta mÒnon tîn Øpost£sewj) 10 but also according to their essence (¢ll¦ kaˆ oÙs…aj diafor£n) 11 , introducing a subordination of power and glory, and losing the correct doctrine (tÁj d ÑrqÒthtoj toà lÒgou diamarte‹n) 12 .
Basil explained to Marcellus that Dionysius did not want to accept the term ÐmooÚsioj because his opponents adopted it in the sense of denying the reality of the three hypostases 13 . The bishop of Cesarea then expresses the proper position after having shed great light on the meanings attributed to the 7 `Omolog…a, in the sense of stoic philosophy same words prior to him, very cautious of the danger of equivocal words. Basil thus states that his opinion was that of accepting that the Son is called Ómoion kat' oÙs…an with respect to the Father, but "only if this is understood in the sense of the invariability of the divine essence": the divine essence, he writes, is immutable (¢parall£ktoj) 14 . Basil thus explains the sense with which the term ÐmooÚsioj had been introduced at Nicaea, interpreting it in the sense also affirmed by other appositive formulae attributed to the Son: light from light, true God from true God. With these it is understood -he explains to Marcellus -that the Unbegotten has no less glory or power than the Father, because it is not possible to conceive of any variation in light in relation to light or of truth in relation to truth 15 . This argument by Basil was brought to light with great clarity by André Tuilier -calling attention to Epistle 52 -in the same years in which Stead published the study on the divine substance in Athanasius. The two are essentially in agreement on the fact that one could not attribute sensu stricto the Aristotelian use of the term ous…a to the Trinitarian arguments, because God clearly was not to be treated like composed substances. But not even Tuilier seemed to take the knowledge of reciprocity as a new and fundamental metaphysical knowledge: "Dans l'esprit même de saint Athanase, il [Basile] rappelle que l'ousie divine n'a rien de commun avec les essences matérielles. Elle est indivisible dans le Père comme dans le Fils. Au reste, en refusant d'admettre une essence unique commune aux trois personnes, on attribuait naturellement, qu'on le veuille ou non, une ousie particulière à chacune d'entre elles" 16 .
Returning to Gregory: he therefore never calls into question the unity of the divine oÙs…a but articulates the meaning of the relational names in a new way, introducing and tracing the consequences of the reciprocal relation (tÁj prÕj ¥llhla scšsewj).
We then see what the consequences are on the level of the unity of the divine substance, when this is taken into account starting from the reciprocity of the relation of the Father and the Son.
Reciprocity.
The point which is in our interest to consider here -responding to Stead's critique of Gregory in light of the semantics of scšsij -is that Eunomius' theology ends up being aporetic in that it is incapable of maintaining the reality of what has been revealed, which consists of the reciprocity of relation between the Father and the Son. Indeed, to introduce gradation means to deny to relation the characteristic of reciprocity in God, Who is eternal, and this was precisely the great speculative contribution of Basil. This is one point on which Gregory vehemently presses Eunomius: Father, when referring to God, signifies the name of a relation in eternity; and thus it is without separation (¢diast£toj) 17 . The ontological indication in this -provided by the relation implicit in the name Father -denies any difference in substance between unbegotten and begotten on the basis of the reciprocity of the scšsij, which is implied in the very notion of Father. This all becomes very clear when Gregory recalls how Christian tradition has desired to conserve the names Father, Son, and Spirit because:
"All men when they hear the titles «father» and «son» immediately recognize from the very names their «intimate and natural relation to each other» (t¾n o"ke…an autîn kaˆ fusik¾n prÕj ¥llhla scšsin). Community of nature is inevitably suggested by these titles" 18 .
Simplicity.
Scšsij as understood in its reciprocity is the pivoting point around which moves a further difficulty that is expressed in the first book of Contra Eunomium. It has to do with the argument regarding the simplicity of God's substance, where scšsij appears in the passage that is focused on the infinite nature of God:
"In cases where the existent by its nature does not admit of the worse, no limit is applicable to goodness; the infinite is not such by its relation to something else (tÍ prÕj ›teron scšsei), but itself by definition evades limitation" 19 .
One gathers from this how Gregory understands relation in infinity to be the reciprocation of oneself (aÙtÕ kaq' ˜autÒ). Hence, it is through reciprocity recognized in light of the revealed and relative name that Gregory defends divine simplicity:
"But if he [Eunomius] detaches and alienates the beings from each other (¢p' ¢ll»lwn), envisaging another being of the Onlybegotten alongside the Father, and yet another of the Spirit alongside the Onlybegotten, and applies to them concepts of greater and less, let it be noted that, while he appears to delight in what is simple, in reality he argues for the composite" 20 .
Observing in which texts scšsij appears within the progression of Gregory's argument allows one to draw upon certain considerations which are inherent to the placement of prÒj together with the term scšsij.
As is known, scšsij is inserted into philosophical and theological discourse with a meaning that is very close to that of prÒj ti. This expression has a preposition that is used to indicate that several terms are being placed in relation with one another 21 : in Gregory we thus find this characterization of scšsij, assuming this preposition, in the passage prÒj ¥llhla scšsij, prÒj ›teron scšsij, prÒj tÕn ØiÕn scšsij, prÒj s scšsij, prÒj tina scšsij 22 . Relation is thereby set up like a reality together with its proper name, which is accompanied by a prepostion that grants it a certain definition with respect to what one means to indicate. The name "relation" in and of itself does not indicate anything concrete, since what specifies relation is the series of terms placed in relation or connection to each other.
So what happens with Gregory? In the exposition of his theory of relative names -he will return to this at length in the Contra Eunomium II and III -it is made explicit that relation is within the names themselves, showing how the relative name itself can have more meanings according to what is the second term of the relation appointed by the name. This is what occupies sections 569-575 of the Contra Eunomium I, wherein Gregory argues the meanings of the term "Father" so as to show how in that term there is also the meaning of relation to the Son as much as there is the meaning of being unbegotten.
This distinction of gnoseological relativity facilitates the display of how the revealed name "Father" can be -on the level of ontology -the bearer of an immanent and relational disposition in the divine essence, even beyond its being said to be a property of God (as unbegotten) 23 . Furthermore, he who monogenoàj ™nnoîn, kaˆ tÕ plšon kaˆ tÕ oelatton ™p' aÙtîn lšgei, m¾ lanqanštw tù mn doke‹n tÕ ¡ploàn carizÒmenoj, tÍ d ¢lhqe…v kataskeu£zwn tÕ sÚnqeton".
21 This is seen in what has been defined by the Grammarians (Dionysus Trace), who on the basis of prÒj ti distinguish relative names from absolute names. There are examples of this when Gregory tackles the argument regarding relative names. In total there are 75 places in which scšsij appears with prÒj, out of around 180 times that σχέσις appears in any form in Gregory's work. 23 The relativity of names is found in book two as well, wherein Gregory explains that thought is an operation of the mind and depends on the decisions of the speaker. It does not subsist in and of itself, rather, it has its subsistence in the choice of those who are in dialogue (ibidem II 334, 10 -335, 1, GNO 1, 323, 31 -324, 1: "oÙ kaq' ˜aut¾n Øfestîsa, ¢ll' ™n tÍ tîn dialegomšnwn ÐrmÍ t¾n ØpÒstasin oecousa"). For Gregory, the freedom of one in dialogue, who makes the decision to use certain meanings which are then placed in dialogue, might give a relational significance or meaning to the relativity, or conventionality, of names. pronounces the name "Father" can do so "independently of the particular relationship", or otherwise taking on the relational meaning 24 .
Freedom.
Hence, in the commentary on the Lord's prayer (Mt 6:9) or the Abba Father (Rom 8:15), Gregory makes explicit his moving from one relative name that indicates something of the knowledge that one has of God to a name that places in relation and expresses a relation, which is something accomplished on the level of existence and not simply that of knowledge 25 . Progress with respect to Basil is seen precisely in his explicating the theory of names that is already present in the second book of Basil's Adversus Eunomium 26 , where Gregory ultimately specifies the content of the relative name insofar as it touches upon the names of God and purposefully includes the fact of existence into the body of our knowledge.
On the fixedness of the reciprocal relationship between the Father and the Son, Gregory comes into conflict with Eunomius in multiple places, for, on account of the infinitude of God's nature, relation in God cannot be subject to any law that is not reciprocity of the relation itself, which itself cannot be subordinated to law. Furthermore, contrary to Eunomius' position 27 , there cannot be any necessity in the analogy of proportional correspondence between activities and God's substance. And this is what is read in passages that include occurances of scšsij that provide a revisiting of Eunomius' formula of the eƒrmÒn 28 . This is seen in the places where Gregory comments on that kind of "bond" that is rightly thought of in God 29 .
The Bishop of Nyssa connects the bond (tÕn eƒrmÒn) to what Eunomius means by innate ordering (sumfuÁ t£xij). Indeed, for Gregory innate ordering might be that which maintains an "invariable bond fixed to the reciprocal relationship" only if there is not separation of substance between Father and Son, and only if a distinction of hypostasis is allowed 30 . 24 Cf. ibidem I 572-573, GNO 1, 191, 2. 25 Cf. ibidem I 573, 1, GNO 1, 191, 21. Cf. also ibidem II 373, 2, GNO 1, 335, 11; ibidem II 459, 6, GNO 1, 360, 22; ibidem II 559, 1, GNO 1, 389, 29. 26 Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, Adversus Eunomium II 9. 27 Here we are talking about the second way, as illustrated in the Apologia. Cf. Eunomius, Apologia 20, ed. R.P. Vaggione, in: Eunomius, The Extant Works, Oxford 1987, 58. 28 Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium I 406, 1-11, GNO 1, 145, 10-20. The same formulation, recalling substance, invariable bond and fixedness (tÍ prÕj ¥llhla scšsei tÕn e"rmÕn ¢par£baton) occurres in ibidem I 154, 1-13, GNO 1, 73, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] One might theorize that the theology used to elaborate the response to Contra Eunomium regarding the fixed and invariable bond (tÕn e"rmÕn ¢par£baton), might have helped Gregory formulate, or distinguish, the formula tÁj scetikÁj ¢kolouq…aj tÕn lÒgon of Refutatio confessionis Eunomii 98, 5: the only place in the debate with Eunomius in which Gregory delineates the order of processions, bestowing upon "bond" (¢kolouq…a instead of e"rmÒj) the character of a hiearchy of relational notions. This questions has been taken up by others. Cf. J. Daniélou, L'être et le temps chez Grégoire de Nysse, Leiden 1970, 36-37. 30 Cf. Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium I 412-413, GNO 1, 146, 13, where in The relational distinction that Gregory recognizes in the very same oÙs…a allows him to consider the ordering of distinction between the Father and the Son, not on the ontological plane of the essence, but in the realm of a logic -that is, not dividing, but distinguishing them according to causality in a manner of relation (in this sense the logical and the relational coincide). But this is true for the reverse as well: the relational distinction of the Father and the Son in the very oÙs…a of God safeguards the immutability of the divine essence and the impossibility of knowing God's substance through notions which are derived from activities 31 .
In this sense, admitting the value of scšsij in God thereby preserves apophaticism for three reasons: 1) the names of Father and Son are not identical to activities (™nerge‹ai), for in God there is no change; 2) the relative names of Father and Son do not merely speak of a notion, but of a relational reciprocity; 3) this is not reducible to noetic content but suggests a true and proper alterity, or otherness, in one single essence, which nevertheless remains unknowable and unspeakable in itself 32 .
We thus find that Gregory works conceptually with regard to innate ordering and the distinction of relational reciprocity, beginning with the immutability of the divine oÙs…a and the scšsij revealed by the divine names. One can thereby trace, though it will be formulated differently, the attention that Basil lends back to the claims of the immutability of the divine substance (¢parall£ktwj) 33 and the natural conjunction (fusik¾ sun£feia) of the relation implied in the name Father.
A further question that is tied to this present discussion -by way of the occurrences of scšsij -is therefore that of the relationship between a name and its notion (oennoia). It is with respect to this aspect as well that Gregory's thought takes a noteworthy turn. Whereas in the Apologia Apologiae Eunomius remains tied to a one-to-one relationship between the notion, name, and divine substance -while accepting Basil's argument on the centrality of the name of the Father instead of the attribute of unbegotten 34 -Gregory expounds an alternative form Eunomius considers the substance of the Father and the Son as two, separate, one apart from the other for reasons of their difference (¢nomiÒthtoj), according to nature (kat¦ t¾n fÚsin), and contrasts being untied through substance (À g¦r ¼nwtai di¦ tÁj oÙs…aj), so that the bond of reciprocal relation remains unaltered. 31 Cf. ibidem I 419-422, GNO 1, 148, 26. 32 The fact that it remains unknowable does not mean that for Gregory man is not included in this same relation. Cf. Gregorius Nyssenus, In Canticum canticorum 1, ed. H. Langerbeck, GNO 6, Leiden 1960, 22, 9 -23, 1. 33 Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, Epistula IX 3, 1-2, ed. Courtonne, I, p. 39. 34 In the section Contra Eunomium I 552ff. Gregory reproduces a passage from the Apologia Apologiae in which Eunomius cites Basil, but he omits the passage on the scšsij, thereby completely passing over the referece to the introduction of the notion of the Son by way of the relation implicit in the name of the Father, and hence passing over any treatment of Basil regarding relative names (cf. Basilius Caesariensis, Adversus Eunomium I 5, 68-69, SCh 299, 176). Gregory reintro-on his thought on the Trinity as deeply centered on the scšsij of the Father and the Son, which leads him -integrating Basil's theory of names -to consider the relationship as existence and the unity of nature in two subjects (™n dÚo to‹j Øpokeimšnoij t¾n ˜nÒthta tÁj fÚsewj) 35 . 6. Unity. Gregory of Nyssa thus establishes that the unity of nature -distinct in the two subjects -is also a unity of the will, characterizing "the natural bond" in a completely different way than does Eunomius 36 . The natural conjunction defended by Basil is spoken of by Gregory as well, as unity of nature (kat¦ t¾n fÚsin) and communion of wills (kaˆ t¾n proa…resin koinwn…aj) 37 . Eunomius, interpreting it incorrectly, traces it to a relationship of generation and subordination in the structure of ordering (t£xij) in created nature, thereby attributing two different substances to the Father and the Son 38 .
Previously, Gregory marks the commonality of nature -indicated by the word "son" in the expression "son of man" -with the pericope tÕ kat¦ t¾n fÚsin o"ke‹on 39 , where the affinity (o"ke‹on) indicates both commonality between natures as well as an intimate relation. With this Gregory distinguishes, within relation, unity that is such by nature and what is such by will. He does this not so as to introduce a twofold or dual principle of unity, but rather to point out that the relational nature of God is different than that which is made necessary in the term t£xij, something that we come across in created realities. The polemical context around the origin of all this as driven by Eunomius, actually gives the expression a particular relevance and one which emphasizes the actual reciprocity of relation between Father and Son in the divine nature.
That the will in immanent relation also emerges in a final appearance of scšsij is worth noting here. It is a quite poetic passage, in which Gregory defines the honor that man must render unto God as a relation of love (À ¢gaphtik¾ scšsij) 40 . The passages that precede this occurence are dedicated to a description of the relationship between the Father and the Son, from duces this in the debate taking up once again the complete citation of Basil in the passage of Contra Eunomium I 559, 3-5, GNO 1, 188, 3-5: "kaˆ t¾n perˆ toà uƒoà oennoian sunhmmšnwj ˜autÍ di¦ tÁj scšsewj suneis£gein". 35 Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium I 498, 1-2, GNO 1, 170, [13] [14] Cf. ibidem I 502, GNO 1, 171, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Eunomius maintains that knowledge of Being through works of creation would be by acts of the will and not through the essence (cf. Eunomius, Apologia 23-24). The difference in Gregory of Nyssa's vision is that, according to Mülenberg, for him the will is not inferior to, but rather is part of the essence. See E. Cavalcanti, Studi Eunomiani, Roma 1976, 71-72. 37 The Father and the Son are also one, the community of being and of purpose coalescing into unity (Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium I 502, (4) (5) (6) GNO 1, 171, (18) (19) (20) : "kaˆ Ð pat¾r kaˆ Ð uƒÕj ›n e"si, tÁj kat¦ t¾n fÚsin kaˆ t¾n proa…resin koinwn…aj e"j tÕ n sundramoÚshj". 38 Cf. ibidem I 483, 1 -5, GNO 1, 166, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] Ibidem I 298, 6-7, GNO 1, 114, [16] [17] Ibidem I 337, 3-4, GNO 1, 127, [4] [5] which it is gathered that, being Son in a relationship of love with the Father, He must also receive the same honor that is given in tribute to the Father.
***
In Contra Eunomium I the Cappodocian consideration of the revealed names affirms the reality of the reciprocal distinction of the Father and the Son as being immanent to the divine essence, and this also becomes the vehicle for the dogmatic definition of the unity and unknowable, and hence unspeakable, nature of the substance of God. The distinction between the Father and the Son is acknowledged as real, and -instead of introducing multiplicity and separation, and thereby a subsequent duality of substance as Eunomius intended with the subordination of the Son to the Father -it becomes the foundation of unity and simplicity precisely because of this consideration of the divine nature. The response to Stead can therefore be placed on this level: the reciprocal relationality of the hypostases does not entail the loss of the unity of nature, because the revelation of the God who is Love allows Gregory to overcome the fixedness of Greek metaphysics, which is governed by the logic of necessity, and to extend the reality of the communion of essence to the will -and therefore to freedom. This divine essence must not be thought of as a sort of substratum that precedes and is opposed to the Persons that are in relation, but rather as being in the reciprocity of eternal and infinite love. This logical passage is made possible by Gregory's firm adhesion to Sacred Scripture as well as his philosophical competency, which he himself must overcome in order to describe a new unity as it is in God: the reality of community within essence is introduced on account of the consideration of relation. And this relation is understood as being implied by the revealed names, but thought of in the context of the characteristics of divine nature -including the characteristics of eternity and infinitude already elaborated upon by theological reflection.
The unity of the divine essence, in the plurality of God's hypostaseis, is therefore indicated not merely through a reference to the metaphysics of essence (communion of nature), but also through reference to the metaphysics of love (communion according to will; tÁj kat¦ t¾n fÚsin kaˆ t¾n proa…resin koinwn…aj). Unity is thereby configured as a reciprocal and infinite -hence unspeakable -disposition of love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. As we have seen, this is achieved through a resemantization of the immanent schesis.
Perhaps it was at this that Stead's dissatisfaction was directed: the need to express the individuation of the hypostasis not through juxtaposition but through relation and reciprocity; these latter considerations constituting a reality which always, existentially, escapes a precise and definitive definition, in addition to the demands of verbal objectification.
(Summary)
The development of Trinitarian thought that occurred in Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium has led some to think that in his debate with Eunomius Gregory introduced a tritheist mode of thinking (G.C. Stead). In having recourse to the scšsij of the Father and of the Son in his polemic with Eunomius, he actually facilitates a recovery of the sense of ÐmooÚsioj in continuity with the doctrine of the two natures as introduced by Athanasius and Basil in the latter's initial response to Eunomius. However, this simultaneously marks a difference in the notion of fÚsij, which is at the level of divinity and has repercussions even in created nature. This paper seeks to show the substance of this variation, something that on account of Eunomian heresy has been introduced by Gregory of Nyssa. 
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